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Abstract 
With a focus on key themes and debates, this article aims to illustrate and assess 
how the interaction between justice and politics has shaped the international regime 
and defined the nature of the international agreement that was signed in COP21 
Paris. The work demonstrates that despite the rise of neo-conservatism and self-
interested power politics, questions of global distributive justice remain a central 
aspect of the international politics of climate change. However, while it is relatively 
easy to demonstrate that international climate politics is not beyond the reach of 
moral contestations, the assessment of exactly how much impact justice has on 
climate policies and the broader normative structures of the climate governance 
regime remains a very difficult task. As the world digests the Paris Agreement, it is 
vital that the current state of justice issues within the international climate change 
regime is comprehensively understood by scholars of climate justice and by 
academics and practitioners, not least because how these intractable issues of 
justice are dealt with (or not) will be a crucial factor in determining the effectiveness 
of the emerging climate regime. 
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Climate Justice and the International Regime: Before, During 
and After Paris  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Contentions over justice have played a significant role in shaping the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), its Kyoto Protocol, and the global treaty 
signed in Paris in December 2015. The UNFCCC has provided a forum for key justice 
issues to be discussed alongside international climate policy.1 However, justice once 
again proved to be a controversial issue in the climate change regime at the recent 
Paris Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP). Perspectives and arguments 
about justice are well-established within the UNFCCC and long-standing divisions 
remain, most prominently between developed and developing countries. There are 
other dimensions to justice within the realm of climate change governance and 
policy, such as gender, indigenous communities, and land use rights, but in general 
these debates play out within the frame of current and historical North-South 
relationships.2 
 As climate politics has developed over the last 20 years, the contours of these 
divisions and the language of the debate have regularly shifted. Many reasons and 
dynamics account for these shifts. First, governments and other norm entrepreneurs 
have gained experience in negotiating with each other (or not) on the subject. 
Second, emission profiles and wealth levels of countries are constantly changing, 
with implications for responsibility and contribution. Third, scientific understanding 
of climate impact forecasts is getting more accurate, and the landscape of the global 
economy and public opinion has evolved in various ways across different parts of the 
world. Moreover, within the international climate change regime new issues have 
emerged, such as loss and damage compensation, and new policy ideas have been 
developed, such as intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs). These 
have brought their debates and disagreements, with justice again forming an 
essential component and source of both momentum and controversy.  
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 With a focus on key contentions, this article aims to illustrate and assess how 
the interaction between justice and politics is shaping the international regime and 
in particular how this influenced the Paris Agreement. We focus on the UNFCCC 
regime deliberately because at present this is the main forum for global justice 
concerns to interact with climate policy. However, we recognise increasing 
momentum in transnational, sub-state and private climate governance, which open 
up new and important dimensions of climate justice across multiple scales.3,4  
Our work here demonstrates that despite the rise of neo-conservatism and 
self-interested power politics, questions of global distributive justice remain a 
central aspect of the international politics of climate change. However, while it is 
relatively easy to demonstrate that international climate politics is not beyond the 
reach of moral contestations, the assessment of exactly how much impact justice has 
on climate policies and the broader normative structures of the climate governance 
regime remains a very difficult task. In fact, with developed countries appearing to 
be ducking their commitments while co-opting developing countries into binding 
emissions reduction and reporting commitments, there are grounds to argue that 
the equity principle of common but differentiated responsibility on which the regime 
has long been anchored is now being replaced with a perverse moral concept that 
the Lead Author has described as “common but shifted responsibility.”5 As the world 
digests the Paris Agreement, it is vital that the current state of justice issues within 
the international climate change regime is comprehensively understood by scholars 
of climate justice and by academics and practitioners, not the least because how 
these intractable issues of justice are dealt with (or not) will be a crucial factor in 
determining the effectiveness of the emerging climate regime.  
 The article is organised into the following three sections. We begin, unlike 
the few existing post-Paris analyses, by explaining how justice issues shaped the 
international regime, in terms of its institutional beginnings and the earliest political 
struggles. We will then discuss how the regime responded to and handled questions 
of justice in the two decades after its creation. In the third and largest section, we 
examine each of the main policy areas within the international regime to highlight 
ongoing controversies relevant to the development of a new regime and indicate 
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implications of the outcome of the Paris Agreement. We conclude with some 
reflection on the state of justice in the international climate regime. 
 
2. How has justice shaped the pre-existing regime? 
 
Justice has been a consistent theme of debate and advocacy throughout the 
development of the international climate change regime from its origin in the early 
1990s.6,7,8 Without a doubt, the influence of justice and equity are critical when 
seeking to understand how the international climate regime has developed, its 
functions and its key policy outputs. However, the theme of justice encompasses a 
kaleidoscope of perspectives and interpretations, making its impact fluid and 
complex. As observed, both justice concerns and impact are entangled with other 
factors shaping the climate regime, such as science, power and economic 
interests.9,10 
 A scientific theory about climate change had existed since the late 19th 
Century, but scientific consensus about the significance of the issue did not 
permeate the political realm until the 1980s. As more data became available and 
computing power allowed more accurate modelling of the implications of climate 
change, the message from the scientific community became clearer and stronger. 
More greenhouse gases were identified, and the extent of the problem and the role 
of anthropogenic emissions could not be ignored.11  
As soon as climate change became a political issue, national positions 
demonstrated a notable distinction between rich, industrialised countries and poor, 
developing countries, reflecting a principle of differentiation that had been evolving 
since the 1970s in successive international environmental treaties. For example, calls 
for international climate justice, North-South equity, and exemplary leadership from 
developed countries are replete in the statements released after the first set of 
international conferences on climate change such as Villach Conference in 1985, and 
the Noordwijk Climate Declaration in 1989.12 
In 1988 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was set up by 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO), creating a global focus for climate change science and formally 
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linking science with intergovernmental politics. 13  Reflecting the widespread 
sentiment on the need for North-South equity. The IPCC’s first report in 1990 
identified the ‘specific responsibilities’ of industrialised countries, noting that 
domestic measures were required because ‘a major part of emissions affecting the 
atmosphere at present originates in industrialised countries where the scope for 
change is greatest’.14 The report further stressed that industrialised countries should 
‘cooperate with developing countries in international action, without standing in the 
way of the latter's development’, including the provision of finance and 
technology.15 
The case for different accountability and obligations set out in the IPCC’s first 
report was crucial in setting the stage for justice to remain central to the 
international regime because it provided the basis and legitimacy for expressing 
justice arguments in the language and data of science. This was particularly 
significant because the IPCC had been viewed, at least in some quarters, as a 
contrivance by some Western governments to depoliticise climate change by 
presenting it as a purely scientific matter.16 In also pointing out that ‘emissions from 
developing countries are growing and may need to grow in order to meet their 
development requirements’, the IPCC drew attention to the considerable challenge 
of reducing overall emissions while allowing developing countries to industrialise. 
This dilemma has, to this date, defined the core of international climate 
negotiations.  
As would be expected, developing countries seized on the points made by 
the IPCC to press their case for culpability and historical responsibility against the 
rich countries in the negotiations for the development of the international regime, 
which took place between 1990 and 1992 under the Intergovernmental Negotiating 
Committee (INC) established by the United General Assembly. However, beginning 
controversy that continues today, rich countries also appealed to justice but in a bid 
to counter perspectives that would obligate them to greater leadership and 
responsibility.17,18  
 Scholars19,20,21 have catalogued the various ways in which contestations for 
justice shaped the design and evolution of the climate regime. First, it is noted that 
early agitations for procedural justice by developing countries resulted in the climate 
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regime being brought within the remit of the UN General Assembly. Developing 
countries felt that the one-country-one-vote system adopted in the UN would help 
mitigate their inability to participate on an equal footing with developed countries in 
the relatively narrow, technical realm of the IPCC. Meanwhile industrialised nations 
preferred the governance to remain within a more technical organisation such as the 
IPCC.22  
Second, concern for justice was central in shaping the objective of the 
UNFCCC, with developing countries keen to highlight the close links between climate 
change, food security and sustainable economic development.23 Okereke argues that 
developing countries, cognisant of the wide-ranging economic implications of 
climate change, saw governance negotiations as an opportunity to redress the 
injustices inherent in the prevailing global economic system. 24 
Third, concerns for justice resulted in several equity principles and provisions 
being included in the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. Key equity terms include the 
“common concern for mankind”, “common but differentiated responsibility”, “per 
capita emissions” and “historical responsibility” among others, while notable equity-
based provisions include differentiation between countries with respect to emissions 
reduction obligations, commitment to North-South financial and technology 
transfers, and acknowledgment of the special need of vulnerable countries.  
The foregoing is not of course to suggest homogeneity of views within 
developed and developing country groups. Even as the climate regime was being 
created, multiple perspectives were evident within and between developed and 
developing countries. For example, vulnerable small island states sought urgent 
action to curb emissions, stressing that climate change was a common concern of 
mankind, while oil-producing nations were wary of global emissions reduction 
targets and regularly highlighted that justice required a respect for sovereignty and 
allowing developing countries unfettered access to resources they desperately need 
to achieve national economic development. Furthermore, large developing countries 
such as China and India focused on their rights to develop (and increase emissions 
accordingly),25 while climate-vulnerable countries emphasised their rights to survival 
and the need for sharp global emissions reduction this entailed.26 Within developed 
countries there were also divisions, with some Nordic countries expressing support 
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for North-South financial transfer and poor countries’ right to development, while 
others, such as the United States, were deeply sceptical of the notion of 
“development rights” and preferred to promote the market as the main source for 
any international resource distribution.  
It is important to note that these arguments and divisions do not merely 
reflect individual countries’ pragmatic assessments of their respective national 
circumstances, but also the multiplicity of philosophical perspectives on what global 
climate justice entails and how it can be achieved in practice. Perspectives have 
proliferated in wider academic and advocacy communities as scholars theorise how 
to apply these philosophical perspectives and achieve justice in the international 
climate regime.27,28  
 
3. How the UNFCCC has responded to questions of justice 
 
Extant literature on the ethical dimensions of the global climate regime suggests that 
the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol have struggled to address satisfactorily the 
multiple questions with which they are confronted.29,30,31 While ambitious and lofty 
in its admission of global justice principles, the UNFCCC signed in 1992 did not 
actually contain specific policies or emission reduction targets and so offered no real 
test of the principles it contained.  
Signed in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was the first real major attempt to 
address climate change. It contained the first global emissions reduction obligations 
and was intended to be the first step in the process of curbing global emissions 
through multilateral governance.32 The Protocol made a bold attempt to carry 
through the principle of differentiation established in the Convention by legally 
obligating only industrialised countries to quantified emission reduction targets. 
However, implementing the Protocol proved politically divisive and became a focal 
point for developed and developing countries alike to position their arguments 
about fairness and equity.33 The United States was swift in its rejection of the 
Protocol, arguing that it was unfair to exempt rapidly developing countries like China 
and India from emission reduction obligations. The US argued that fairness required 
a focus more on current and future emissions rather than on historical pollution, 
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some of which took place before the full consequences of the problem were known. 
Moreover, on the grounds of pragmatism they argued it would be pointless for the 
West to reduce emissions while allowing untrammelled carbon pollution from some 
of the world’s highest emitters located in the developing world. The US rejection of 
the Protocol contributed to the widespread perception that the climate change 
regime exists to allocate economic burdens and essentially penalise economically 
successful countries.  
 In 1992, Parties established equity as a cornerstone of the regime by 
embedding differentiation in the UNFCCC treaty in the form of the common but 
differentiated responsibility principle (CBDR).34 However, the interpretation and 
implementation of CBDR have proven to be major sources of ongoing disagreements 
in the evolution of the climate change regime. In general, developing countries have 
tended to emphasise the “differentiated responsibility” part of the CBDR and in 
doing so demanded not only exemption from tough obligations, but also bold 
leadership by developed countries and substantial financial and technical assistance. 
Developed countries have tended to place more weight on the “common” aspect of 
CBDR, and consequently demanded that effective action on climate change requires 
concerted effort and sacrifice from all parties. Furthermore, developed countries 
often reject the charge of climate change culpability, preferring that calls for 
leadership and assisting developing countries should instead be justified on the 
grounds of their superior economic and technological capabilities. The result is that 
almost all references to CBDR in UNFCCC texts since the Copenhagen summit are 
now styled as common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities 
(CBDR+RC) (emphasis ours). 
 Expectedly, redistributive funding has been a key focus of justice 
controversies within the regime, with disagreements spanning aspects such as how 
much funding is appropriate or necessary, which specific goals to prioritise, the 
criteria for disbursement, and how the overall targets should be divided between 
different countries. Here again, the regime has proven very dynamic in rhetoric but 
far less successful in implementation. On the one hand, developing countries have 
regularly lamented the lack of adequate, predictable and long-term climate finance. 
They also accuse developed countries of reneging on their promises and justice 
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responsibilities. Developed countries, on the other hand, insist they are doing their 
best in very tough economic conditions and express concern that some developing 
countries are attempting to use climate change as an excuse to get developed 
countries to fund their national economic development.  
Available figures35 reveal a wide disparity between pledges of almost $14bn 
and the less than $4bn actually transferred into the Global Environmental Facility 
(GEF) and Green Climate Fund (GCF), the two primary climate funds. Planned 
approvals are lower still at just over $2bn, and money spent is a fraction of the 
money received, let alone the pledges. While the process of planning and executing 
projects can be admittedly complex, these figures reveal a huge gap between 
rhetoric, pledges and action with regard to climate equity in the UNFCCC, and help 
explain why many feel that global justice obligations have regularly been trounced 
by hard economic and power politics rooted in the anarchic nature of the 
international system. 
Another battleground for justice disputes in the regime has concerned what 
should be the primary policy tool for stimulating climate change action at national 
and international levels. Despite agitations from several quarters, especially 
developing countries, the UNFCCC has at the behest of capitalist countries, especially 
the United States, more or less enthroned market-based mechanisms such as the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and other tools like payments for ecosystem 
services and carbon trading schemes as the main vehicle for climate action and 
North-South financial redistribution.  
A key argument from proponents is that the market mechanism offers a 
flexible and efficient means to reduce emissions within countries and across the 
world. 36 , 37  However, policy areas such as REDD+ that engage with market 
mechanisms involve numerous complex issues of local participation, human rights 
and indigenous groups, although the conversation about design and implementation 
remains state-centric. Critics argue that communities are often displaced or excluded 
from the payments as a result of implementation,38 and schemes can reinforce 
existing social inequalities and power imbalances, thereby having a detrimental 
impact on local justice issues even if local communities do receive some 
compensation.39 , 40 , 41  Phelps, Friess and Webb,42  for example, suggest that by 
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changing the value of forest land, the CDM mechanism has exposed divisions 
between forest communities and national governments that has extended into the 
UNFCCC forum. Schroeder43 argues that national governments are liable to favour 
the rights of elites over marginalised communities, a significant hurdle for achieving 
climate justice in the international regime. 
It is widely recognised that for developing countries, increased capacity and 
access to clean technology are key to designing and implementing low-carbon 
development paths. However, despite repeated emphasis in different parts of the 
agreement, capacity building and technology transfer remain underdeveloped 
aspects of the international climate change regime, overshadowed by mitigation and 
without a strong institutional base within the regime’s structure. 
Lastly, although the instrumental value of procedural justice is clear, in 
addition to its moral significance,44 the regime has also struggled to cope with the 
demand for greater procedural justice and participation from developing countries 
and non-nation-state actors.45,46 While the one-country-one-vote structure remains 
intact, the fact that decisions within the UNFCCC continue to require consensus has 
afforded more powerful countries the leeway to impose their will through a 
combination of high-handed and tactful diplomacy.47,48 At the same time, the angst 
that followed the lack of or perceived lack of procedural justice in the Copenhagen 
COP resulted in a renewed attention to the need for inclusiveness in the search for a 
more comprehensive regime that will replace the Kyoto Protocol from 2020, when 
the second commitment period comes to an end. However, the emerging regime 
that saw a new global agreement reached in Paris in 2015 remains dogged by a 
widely acknowledged lack of fair and effective participation by developing countries 
and non-nation-state actors.  
4. Justice in the Emerging Regime 
The road to a new comprehensive climate change treaty was formalised at the 
Durban COP in 2011 when all parties agreed to work towards signing a treaty in 
2015, by means of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced 
Action (ADP). Previous attempts to agree a global framework, in Copenhagen in 
2009, failed woefully primarily because of clashes between developed and 
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developing countries about how to handle difficult questions of justice in the post-
Kyoto agreement. The US had categorically rejected any agreement that did not 
place comparable obligations on China.49 This position was consistent with their 
longstanding view that global climate equity required symmetrical action from a 
wider group of countries but was hardened by the rapidly changing geopolitical and 
emissions landscapes. The EU determined they could not take on the burden of 
climate change action without the involvement of the US, as doing so would damage 
their global economic competitiveness. Moreover, China, with the backing of many 
developing countries, was insistent that the fundamental principle of equity and 
differentiation enshrined in Kyoto needed to be carried forward to any new 
agreement.  
 Equity and CBDR are not mentioned explicitly in the text of the Durban 
agreement because developed countries insisted that CBDR must be qualified in light 
of “contemporary economic realities”. In fact Todd Stern, the lead United States 
negotiator in Durban, was reported to have said: ‘If equity’s in, we’re out.’50 
Rajamani51 has argued that this suggests differentiation between countries, which, 
she says, reached a ‘high-water mark’ in 1997 with the Kyoto Protocol, is now ‘on 
the wane’. As it turns out, how to address differentiation was arguably one of the 
most contentious issues during Paris COP in 2015 as parties struggled to balance 
between creating an ambitious regime while recognising historical and current 
responsibilities for climate change. This is hardly surprising because as many scholars 
noted, although equity is not mentioned explicitly in the text of the Durban 
Agreement, the treaty’s commitment to the principles of the UNFCCC implies an 
affirmation of the centrality of the principle of equity (in the form of CBDR+RC) as 
the cornerstone of the international climate regime.52 The Lima Call for Climate 
Action (agreed at COP20) reaffirmed that a 2015 treaty must be based on principles 
of equity and CBDR+RC, but all options for implementing differentiation remained on 
the table at UN meetings leading up to the Paris COP.53  
 Following the signing of the Durban Agreement, which committed both 
developed and developing country Parties to ambitious action, nearly all the key 
policy discussions leading up to the Paris COP21 focused on how to design a 
comprehensive international regime that is based on voluntary, nationally 
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determined emissions reduction commitments. More or less explicit in these 
discussions were the justice implications of national pledges, policies and bilateral 
funding arrangements. These INDCs, of which 161 were declared by 188 countries 
before Paris, now represent the foundational thrust of the new climate regime and a 
feature that mostly clearly sets it apart from the more “top-down” Kyoto Protocol, 
where countries were assigned obligations based on a globally agreed emissions 
reduction target. Analysis of climate justice within the regime must therefore engage 
with the equity implications of this new voluntarist climate governance framework 
and how the contributions deliver ambitious and fair climate action in the context of 
global sustainable development. 
 Just as the discussion develops about how to effectively address equity in 
the next phase of the climate change regime, there are increasing calls to overhaul 
the frame through which climate change action should be viewed. Traditionally seen 
as a distribution of unwanted economic burdens, a view reinforced by the actions of 
developed states such as the USA, numerous voices are now calling for a language 
and attitude of opportunity for green economy transition to prevail.54 Also prevalent 
in discourse is the capabilities approach, which encapsulates the economic, social 
and personal capabilities necessary to pursue a decent livelihood and realise human 
rights. It is argued that this approach can help policymakers understand the 
implications of climate change and the potential impacts, both positive and negative, 
of policies they create.55 There is also a growing agitation to link climate change 
governance more firmly and meaningfully with wider objectives of sustainable 
development, poverty reduction and tackling global inequality.  
 
3.1 Mitigation 
Mitigating the effects of climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions is one 
of the core pillars of the climate change regime, but a just global climate change 
mitigation target and how to share it equitably remain controversial. A maximum 2°C 
global mean temperature rise by 2100 was adopted as a target at the Cancun COP in 
2010, but vulnerable groups continued to highlight the potential injustice of 
selecting a target that still involves severe harm on particularly vulnerable 
communities. Island states and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) have drawn 
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attention to this potential injustice with their slogan “1.5 to Stay Alive”, and their 
representatives are vocal within the climate change regime, often referring to the 
devastating human impact on their populations should temperature rise exceed the 
1.5°C threshold.56  
 The Paris Agreement includes an aim of ‘holding the increase in the global 
average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing 
efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C.’57 Some have considered the 
inclusion of this target as a triumph of justice. However, a closer look reveals that 
the moral implications of a 1.5°C target are complex. First, it is more or less clear 
that the probability of meeting this target limit is extremely low. It has been widely 
reported that the aggregated INDC mitigation commitments, if fully implemented, 
still commit the planet to warming of between 2.7 and 3.7°C.58 It is therefore 
arguable that the 1.5°C target is deceptive, inspires a sense of false hope and runs 
the risk of robbing the Paris Agreement of scientific (and ultimately public and 
political) credibility. A counter argument might be that the 1.5°C target can serve a 
useful moral purpose of motivating and inspiring the most ambitious action possible, 
even if it is evident from the outset that the target might not be attained.  
 Second, a 1.5°C target entails a significantly reduced global carbon space, 
which could in turn jeopardise the development aspirations of some developing 
countries. This sentiment was evident in the opposition by the Arab Group and to a 
lesser extent India to the inclusion of the 1.5°C target in draft texts during the Paris 
negotiations.59 Third, the “just transition” scholarship has catalogued a range of local 
and national social justice and human rights implications that might be associated 
with aggressive decarbonisation in the pursuit of limiting warming to 1.5°C. 
However, the literature by no means suggests that injustice and human rights abuses 
are inevitable under these scenarios.60,61,62 In fact, many scholars have argued that 
the lack of ambitious action portends far greater injustice and human rights abuse 
for vulnerable countries and communities than aggressive greenhouse gas reduction 
measures.63,64 The Paris Agreement contains reference that Parties should respect 
their obligations to human rights when taking action to address climate change, 
suggesting a recognition of this range of views. One distinct possibility is that the 
reference to human rights in the Agreement could provide useful ammunition to 
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forest-dependent and oil bearing communities that might wish to challenge climate 
policies and block oil exploration, respectively.  
 Realistically, however, the immediate climate justice problem with the 
Paris Agreement is not about the moral implications of pursing 1.5°C but the huge 
ambition gap that remains. Texts in earlier drafts, which talk about a peaking of 
global greenhouse gas emissions in 2030 and achieving zero emissions by 2060 to 
2080, were all deleted in the final Agreement, with Parties merely agreeing to reach 
a global peaking ‘as soon as possible’.65 In the end, the Paris Agreement sets no long-
term global mitigation timeline, leaving important questions unanswered about the 
way mitigation will proceed over the coming decades and whether mitigation will be 
sufficient, let alone equitable. Relatedly, the Paris Agreement offers precious little 
about the means of actually keeping emissions below relevant atmospheric 
concentrations. Only once is the phrase “renewable energy” used, in connection 
with Africa, and virtually no mention is made of coal, oil, fossil fuel subsidies, carbon 
tax or the need to reign in vested corporate interests. The Agreement, however, 
recognises the important role of sustainable lifestyles and sustainable patterns of 
consumption and production in addressing climate change, ‘with developed 
countries taking the lead’. 66  In June 2015, the G7 countries made a public 
commitment to decarbonising their economies by 2100 and acknowledged that 
much of the effort will need to be undertaken by 2050.67 However, their statement 
did not contain any concrete plans or schedules, and the Paris COP did not attempt 
to make any link with this historic commitment. 
 Before and during Paris, the overwhelming focus of Parties, especially 
developed countries with regards to mitigation, was on the need for ‘widest possible 
participation by all countries,’ or put differently, how to nuance the more or less 
binary division between developed and developing countries in the pre-existing 
regime. Accordingly, there was plenty of debate about exactly what “participation” 
means in this context. A cursory examination reveals multiple and often conflicting 
interpretations linked to differing economic positions and philosophical 
perspectives. Developed countries have tended to interpret widest possible 
participation as meaning that as many countries as possible, including those in the 
developing world, should take on quantified emission reduction obligations 
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comparable in both form and substance.68 Developing countries, meanwhile, tend to 
interpret participation in a more relaxed way, suggesting that it includes all efforts to 
respond to climate change including adaptation and sustainable development. 
Furthermore, invoking relevant provisions in the original UNFCCC convention (e.g. 
Article 4.1), developing countries stress that adequate support from industrialised 
countries in the form of finance, technology, and capacity building remain essential 
preconditions for their action on climate change.  
 The Paris Agreement provides that all parties will undertake and 
communicate ambitious efforts to achieve a long-term temperature goal including 
the global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions. This and several other requirements 
for emissions measurement, national planning, reporting and transparency place a 
huge burden on many developing countries, especially in the context of vague 
wordings on the support that will be provided to help developing countries 
undertake action. However, the Agreement does grant that peaking will take longer 
for developing countries and the special situation of the LDCs should be recognised. 
Moreover, the Agreement stresses in many places that the global response to 
climate change needs to happen in the context of sustainable development and 
efforts to eradicate poverty.69 
 These provisions are in line with a key part of the practical aspect of 
climate justice, which is ensuring the ability of developing countries to develop and 
industrialise is not compromised by restrictions placed on them by climate policy. A 
notion of equitable access to sustainable development (EASD) had gained some 
traction within the international regime as a framework in which to address the 
moral dimensions of climate change and encourage collaboration,70 but this was not 
picked up with any real force in the Paris Agreement. The treaty, however, does 
invoke the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which replaced the Millennium 
Development Goals in 2015, and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the third 
International Conference on Financing for Development. Fighting climate change and 
using natural resources sustainably are core to the SDGs and sit alongside other aims 
such as ending poverty, securing education and health services, and reducing 
inequality.71 However, other than these references the Agreement makes very 
limited, if any, attempt to link the climate regime to the wider global effort to tackle 
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poverty, address global inequality, and engender sustainable development. 
 Many authors, notably Simon Caney, have challenged the institutional 
isolation of climate change policy within the international regime, instead advocating 
an “integrationist” approach that considers climate change ‘in light of a general 
account of global justice’.72 By advocating a focus on meeting the basic needs of all 
persons, Caney suggests a basis for designing climate policy and determining a fair 
distribution of emissions, and provides a theoretical perspective that echoes calls 
from developing countries that climate change is inherently tied to other challenges 
such as poverty and health. Since development is a key issue for nations within the 
climate regime, as well as outside it, a more co-ordinated approach may prove 
essential if the more voluntary nature of the regime and the Paris Agreement is not 
to lead to continued failure, or indeed greater burden on developing countries who 
have been more or less co-opted into ambitious emissions reduction commitments. 
 
3.2 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) 
 
A more voluntary approach to national commitments has emerged as the key 
approach for future global action on climate change, reflecting determined 
opposition by powerful countries to an extension of a Kyoto Protocol-type 
agreement with its emphasis on top-down mandatory obligations. The pledge-and-
review formula is based on INDCs, where each country makes a statement detailing 
what climate action it intends to implement over a given period of time horizon. It 
started to become evident that a pledge and review approach would replace the 
Kyoto Protocol-style obligations when the Copenhagen COP failed to produce a 
global deal but proceeded to “take note” of the patchwork of national commitments 
and contributions that were announced during and in the run up to the summit. 
Subsequently, COP 19 in Warsaw in 2013 included a decision inviting parties ‘to 
initiate or intensify domestic preparations for their intended nationally determined 
contributions, without prejudice to the legal nature of the contributions, in the 
context of adopting a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with 
legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties’.73 
 This indistinct beginning highlights a key problem with a voluntary 
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approach to climate change action: if each Party can determine what goes into their 
contribution, there is no guarantee that any or all will contain commitments that are 
equitable, ambitious and legally binding.74 Despite consuming large amounts of 
negotiating time, no greater clarity on design, methodology or baselines was 
achieved in subsequent UN meetings (e.g. the 2014 COP in Lima, SBSTA 42 in Bonn in 
June 2015) and eventually in the Paris Agreement itself. Parties are encouraged to 
explain the equitability of their contributions but this is not mandatory, and 
including an explanation will do nothing to ensure all the various INDCs tie together 
into a cohesive whole and create a fair and equitable basis for the emerging 
regime.75  
 Proponents of the pledge and review system are usually quick to criticise 
the Kyoto Protocol for being complex and ineffective.76 However, it is not exactly 
clear how the patchwork of intended contributions represents a simplification of the 
climate regime and it is even less clear how to monitor progress on ambition and 
fairness in the context of such a bewildering cacophony of pledges. Differing 
approaches to distributing emissions reduction targets amongst developed and 
developing countries have been noted in contributions from the USA and China77 
and under-reporting of coal consumption – up to 17% in the case of China – was 
revealed just before COP21.78  
 The lack of a framework through which to assess INDCs, both in terms of 
their ambition and their equity credentials, means there is nothing to prevent these 
differences becoming the source of intense disagreement during discussions by the 
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement, which has been tasked with 
developing further guidance on features of the INDCs. Similarly, fractious debates 
about fairness can be expected in planned discussions to elaborate the scope and 
modalities for the global “stocktake”, which should assess the collective progress 
towards achieving the ultimate objective of the Agreement, including the overall 
effect of the INDCs, consideration of long term strategies, the state of adaptation 
efforts, and support for developing countries. 
 Scholarly attention must turn to the justice implications of the 
institutionalisation of a culture of voluntary contributions. While the role of 
multilateral arrangements may be enhanced because a central body is required to 
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monitor INDCs and ensuring they meet relevant criteria, it appears unlikely the 
UNFCCC can perform this function in the absence of an agreed basis for judging 
whether contributions are fair and equitable in design, or indeed sufficient to meet 
agreed warming limits. At the same time, it may be that voluntary contributions 
allow developing countries to resist pressure to lower their expectations of 
differentiation, and articulate more strongly and clearly what climate justice entails 
within the heart of the governance regime. It could be argued that the INDCs have 
the virtue of allowing developing countries to determine their contributions without 
having a target imposed on them by the more powerful countries, as might have 
been the case under a target-based agreement. However, such an argument would 
be difficult to sustain given that developing countries are not formulating their 
contributions in isolation. The process remains part of the wider negotiation sphere 
and has consequently involved the bargaining and pressure from developed 
countries that one would expect in this level of international relations. As a result, 
agreeing the new voluntary regime has involved some developing countries signing 
up to undertake ambitious climate action without firm promises of adequate 
support. The full extent and implications of such pressure and the implications of 
“ambition” rhetoric should be seen as an important aspect of analysing the voluntary 
regime. 
 Lessons from other international governance regimes indicate that 
incorporating equity in a concrete and multidimensional manner is an essential 
component of political and policy success. 79  However, an Equity Reference 
Framework (ERF)80 to guide the development of the 2015 regime, which uses factors 
such as historical responsibility, current capabilities and an assessment of 
development needs to gauge what a fair contribution entails, did not gain traction in 
the negotiations preceding Paris. Klinsky et al.81 have argued that a capabilities 
approach with reference to securing human rights can facilitate the realisation of the 
“respective capabilities” element of the CBDR+RC principle, by providing a means to 
judge what expectations are appropriate for different countries, and what kinds and 
levels of support they should receive. Support is necessary from a practical 
perspective since many countries are limited in the technical and financial resources 
they can apply to INDC preparation. Developing countries continue to call for more 
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support, but this is but one aspect of the broader support and redistribution 
measures within the international regime, all of which remain contested. Research 
for UNFCCC and UNDP earlier in 2015 showed that more than a quarter of countries 
were still awaiting international support with their INDCs.82  
 The challenges of support and consistency are encapsulated in the debate 
about including adaptation in INDCs. In advance of Paris, some developing countries 
were increasingly in favour of doing so,83 and adaptation has been an important part 
of a wider debate about the scope of INDCs. NGOs have argued developed countries 
should include adaptation support beyond their borders when producing their 
INDCs,84 but developed countries including Canada and the United States have 
clearly stated they consider adaptation outside the remit of INDCs.85 At the same 
time, including adaptation potentially requires greater time and resources, which are 
in short supply for the most vulnerable countries. At Lima in 2014, parties were 
simply invited to ‘consider including an adaptation component in their intended 
nationally determined contributions’,86 but in Paris adaptation was acknowledged as 
a legitimate component of INDCs. 
 
3.3 Adaptation 
Despite officially being given the same priority within the UNFCCC process,87 
adaptation has received significantly less attention than mitigation, which has taken 
most of the focus in global discussions about climate change justice. This is 
particularly problematic for many low income countries that contribute little to 
climate change, because adaptation is the highest priority when considering duties 
to their citizens.88 In contrast with the global level, at the national and regional level 
in the Global South, adaptation has received the majority of lobbying and investment 
attention. This is principally because, in terms of responding to climate change, 
adaptation has been viewed as the key link between climate change, risk, poverty, 
and development.89 However, it is arguable that this view was also shaped by the 
perspective that positioning mitigation as the responsibility of developed nations 
would reinforce appropriate liability for climate change. More recently, however, 
scholars have stressed that an integrative approach that combines adaptation and 
mitigation is a key requirement for an optimum climate solution.90 
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 Moellendorf91 has reinforced the moral basis for an integrative approach, 
by arguing that when considering the realisation of climate justice it is prudent to 
remember that mitigation and adaptation are both moral obligations within a 
response to climate change. Mitigation involves directly targeting the ultimate cause 
of climate change, which is necessary because climate change has the potential to 
bring about effects that cannot be alleviated through adaptation. Adaptation is also 
a moral necessity because the impacts of climate change are already apparent and 
will continue to worsen as current and future emissions affect the climate further.92 
Furthermore, adaptation is important for intergenerational justice, since the less 
mitigation that is done now, the greater the effects of climate change will be and the 
more adaptation will be required.93 
 In Paris, adaptation received mixed attention. On the one hand, developing 
countries were successful in ensuring that adaptation planning and indications of 
funding needs can be legitimately included in their INDCs, despite initial resistance 
from developed countries who wanted the INDCs to be focused on mitigation. In 
addition, a specific goal for adaptation was included in the Paris Agreement, and 
linked to the mitigation target.94 Vulnerable groups like the LDCs, AOSIS and African 
countries had demanded such a goal, with a key aim of ensuring adaptation is 
considered as a global responsibility within the international regime. This is in line 
with the Bali Action Plan, adopted within the UNFCCC in 2007, which gave mitigation 
and adaptation equal status within the evolving climate regime.95 On the other hand, 
no measurement mechanism was included in the Paris Agreement and texts 
explicitly linking aggregate mitigation levels and support from developed countries 
for adaptation were deleted in the final Agreement. Instead, however, “cycles of 
action” are intended to increase ambition and effort on adaptation as the regime 
moves forwards. Moreover, while allowing flexibility for the different circumstances 
and resources of different countries, the Paris Agreement does little to ensure 
funding requirements will be met or that vulnerable countries will actually be able to 
design and implement measures to meet their adaptation needs. 
 Within the international regime, National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) are the 
means by which countries will articulate their adaptation needs and planning over 
the medium- and long-term. So far this process has been focused on LDCs, but there 
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has been no firm decision about whether this should be extended to other countries. 
Funding for creating NAPs is also a key outstanding issue, and ties in with similar 
uncertainty about INDCs. In advance of the Paris COP21, the African Group criticised 
the ‘inadequate funds and lack of clear guidance on how developing countries can 
access direct financial support for formulating and implementing NAPs’.96 This 
criticism contrasted with official confirmation that funding is available from the GCF 
to assist with NAPs, suggesting a misalignment of the governance regime and the 
nations subject to it. If the regime does not successfully meet the needs of the most 
vulnerable countries, these failures will contribute to the ongoing marginalisation of 
the poorest developing countries within the regime and restrict their empowerment 
to participate fully. 
 Moellendorf97 has recently restated the strong moral basis to the claim 
developing nations have to be relieved of the burden of adapting to climate change, 
rooted in their relative poverty and relatively small contribution to the problem. 
Since development is a critical means of reducing vulnerability, this claim can take 
the form of development resources and is consequently linked directly to equitable 
access to sustainable development and the concept of “carbon space”. NAPs are also 
linked strongly to national development strategies. Tracking vulnerability can also be 
a practical means to target spending on adaptation while at the same time providing 
a conceptual basis for the obligations developed states have towards developing 
states. Climate justice cannot be achieved simply by raising sufficient financial 
commitments, however, and the NGO community has pointed out the need to strive 
for community-specific adaptation measures that place human rights and indigenous 
knowledge at their centre.98 A key challenge is ensuring the post-2015 international 
regime adequately recognises the importance of adaptation and can ensure 
adaptation plans are implemented in a way that promotes justice at the local level as 
well as the global level. 
 
3.4 Finance 
While headline figures and financial pledges are not sufficient to address climate 
change without considering what happens with the money, securing the 
commitments and organising the proportions involved in provision and distribution 
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of finance are vital to addressing climate change and realising climate justice. Flows 
of finance are also a public indicator necessary to increase confidence that 
developed countries will meet their emissions commitments.99 Redistributive flows 
provide a visible and practical response to the justice claims of vulnerable 
developing countries that they should not bear an unfair burden of climate change 
action. In practice, however, developing countries are diverting more and more of 
their already-limited spending to adaptation and risk reduction because financial 
flows are not sufficient to meet their needs. The burdens are not being lifted from 
them and as a result other government spending on health, education and 
infrastructure is vulnerable in the face of the overwhelming urgency and severity of 
climate change.100 
 The Copenhagen COP in 2009 generated important political momentum in 
climate finance, with developed countries pledging a “fast-start” of $30bn in 2010-
2012 and reaching $100bn a year by 2020.101 However, the pledges have not led to a 
sufficient shift towards increasing and reliable flows of finance,102 so funding is 
lagging behind the commitments and the needs of developing countries.103 In Paris 
no new figure for finance was agreed upon, with commentators criticising the 
continued lack of clarity on how financing will actually be measured and therefore 
monitored to ensure developed countries are meeting the headline commitments 
they made in Copenhagen and reiterated in Paris.104  
 The GCF was set up in 2010 as the key means of administering 
redistributive financial flows, but while this mechanism brings to life the principle of 
redistributive justice it also captures the disagreement surrounding how to 
implement CBDR in climate policy. Based on mobilising voluntary public and private 
contributions, with a lack of enforcement capabilities and COP-level oversight, the 
GCF has been criticised as moving away from UNFCCC principles, including CBDR.105 
Vanderheiden includes the GCF’s loose recommendation to operate along Kyoto 
Protocol categorisation of developed and developing countries in the failure of the 
GCF to further CBDR. However, as the regime develops and constructive participants 
look for ways to create more dynamic differentiation between Parties, this vague 
framework could prove to allow advantageous flexibility in shaping climate finance. 
Referring back to the evolving circumstances of differentiation, it is notable that 
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countries such as South Korea and Mexico, which are in the developing country 
category in the Kyoto Protocol regime, have pledged contributions to the GCF.106 
 Agreements to redistribute money or secure particular amounts will not be 
sufficient to support developing countries and achieve recognisable climate justice. 
The way finance is provided is important, too, since there are already well-
established aid flows from the developed to developing world. Assurance is 
necessary that aid will not be diverted away from existing commitments towards 
climate-related funding, thereby reducing the additional burden taken on by 
developed countries and limiting the benefits for justice. Preventing the diversion of 
existing funds is important for enhancing confidence that the financial mechanisms 
within the international climate regime are not geared towards the interests of 
donor nations.107 
 
3.5 Loss and Damage 
Loss and damage refers to the effects of climate change that countries are not 
adapted or cannot adapt to; principles of justice are invoked to claim a right to 
compensation when countries experience such effects but did little to cause climate 
change. The IPCC has confirmed that climate change is likely to breach the limits of 
adaptation, and many countries have been vocal about the need for a mechanism 
within the international regime to administer compensation. From a justice 
perspective, the claims for compensation will be narrower than for adaptation, since 
it is much more difficult to prove a direct link between climate change and specific 
extreme weather events, as opposed to longer-term trends in weather and sea-
level.108 Discussions in annual COP meetings from 2010 led to the formulation of a 
mechanism at the Warsaw COP19 in 2013, designed to foster knowledge sharing on 
risk management, strengthen co-operation on tools and approaches to addressing 
loss and damage, and enhancing financial and technical support. 109  Reaching 
agreement was not straightforward, though, and only achieved after a move by 
Australia to postpone discussions on loss and damage until after the 2015 Paris COP 
prompted a mass walkout from frustrated developing countries. 110  The Paris 
Agreement preserves the Warsaw Mechanism, which had been due to expire in 
2016. 
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Until the Paris COP21, loss and damage had been kept within the adaptation 
pillar of the UNFCCC. More than any other area, loss and damage requires a move 
away from the spirit of aid and compassion that has characterised the existing 
climate change regime.111 In Paris, loss and damage was recognised as a distinct 
component within the regime for the first time, adding legitimacy to the claims of 
developing countries. However, this was only achieved alongside specific 
acknowledgement in the treaty that it ‘does not involve or provide a basis for any 
liability or compensation.’112 This was seen as essential to ensure the US Congress 
did not reject the entire Paris Agreement,113 and follows the track record of 
developed nations, who throughout the history of the climate change regime have 
sought vigorously to deflect issues of blame and liability raised by the pursuit of 
compensatory justice. For example, at Warsaw COP19, the EU’s climate 
commissioner said: ‘We cannot have a system where we have automatic 
compensation when severe events happen around the world. That is not feasible’.114 
The Paris outcome on loss and damage reveals important boundaries and 
power-dynamics of the international regime, and highlights the way domestic 
political circumstances in developed countries can influence the way justice is 
realised or avoided in the international regime. Neither developed nor developing 
countries have prevailed in loss and damage discussions, and the issue remains at 
the forefront of justice concerns within the international regime. 
 
3.6 Capacity Building 
Capacity building refers to increasing nations’ ability to respond to the challenges 
they face from climate change, through both mitigation and adaptation. Capacity 
building goes beyond technological and financial resources. It encompasses 
knowledge, infrastructure, human resources and other elements, all of which affect 
the way a nation is able to use technology and funding in its local responses to 
climate change. NGOs and vulnerable countries alike are vocal about the importance 
of capacity building within the overall relationship between developed and 
developing countries in responding to climate change.115,116 CDM projects and 
payments for ecosystem services models provide numerous examples of local or 
community equity being overlooked or given a low priority by investors, and 
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payments bypassing the poorest and most vulnerable.117 No matter how much 
financial and technological support is made available, climate justice cannot be 
achieved if developing countries are unable to make use of these resources because 
their capacity to build and implement systems, infrastructure and processes is 
limited and powerful local actors can capture the benefits.  
Like other aspects of the global response to climate change, capacity building 
has been overshadowed within the international regime by mitigation and has often 
been treated as an afterthought. In practice, capacity building has suffered from a 
lack of sustained, long-term investment as donors lose interest, developing country 
governments are unable to maintain project momentum, and cohesive enabling 
institutions do not exist. Some scholars have suggested that a separate, defined 
institution is necessary to ensure capacity building receives appropriate attention 
and funding, and can maximise the effectiveness of relevant funding.118 Others have 
described capacity building as a “cross-cutting” component of the international 
regime, which can be effectively addressed by using existing institutions and 
processes.119 
There remain no formal targets within the international regime to stimulate 
capacity building, despite calls by developing countries.120 At COP21 in 2015, the 
Paris Committee on Capacity-building was created, aiming to ‘address gaps and 
needs, both current and emerging, in implementing capacity-building in developing 
country Parties and further enhancing capacity-building efforts’.121 While a positive 
step, the text is lacking in specific detail about mechanisms that will deliver practical 
change to capacity building efforts. This reinforces how capacity building illustrates 
the complex multiscalar nature of both governance and justice within the global 
response to climate change. It is increasingly understood within the international 
regime that a global response to climate change must enable developing countries 
to participate fully, both in terms of achieving justice and ensuring the commitments 
and mechanisms agreed and funded at the highest level of governance can actually 
be implemented. 
Identifying practical needs in developing countries remains an important 
challenge for operationalising capacity building, although efforts continue at the 
UNFCCC level to work with developing countries to identify needs122 and implement 
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a framework.123 Importantly, however, it is a key difficulty within the regime but also 
a key requirement of realising climate justice to link top-down policies to the local 
context by facilitating local ownership, engagement and understanding, thereby 
increasing the potential for successful implementation. Capacity building is 
necessary to achieve these objectives, and in turn achieve justice through 
adaptation, mitigation, and procedural design. At the same time, capacity building 
must operate in reverse, with the international regime and its institutions devoting 
greater attention to understanding local level conditions and capabilities when 
designing policy.124 
 
3.7 Technology Transfer 
In a similar way to capacity building, technology transfer is a policy area often given 
a lower level of attention than mitigation within the international regime. However, 
technology transfer has been given a place at the centre of climate justice, since 
technology is seen as essential for low-carbon development. The logic follows that 
developing country governments with obligations towards their citizens will pursue 
development and increase their energy generation using the technology available to 
them and within their financial reach. Prominent advocates such as Mary Robinson 
assert that if the international regime is to foster justice rather than impede it, 
policies must not penalise developing countries by seeking to prevent fossil fuel-
based development.125 Instead, facilitating a low-carbon development path can 
achieve the twin aims of development and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Such 
perspectives link climate change action with development, reflecting the similar 
prevalence of discussions on trade, capital flows and economic growth in the 
international regimes governing both climate change and development.126 
Technology becomes an instrument of justice, but one inherently bound up 
with the existing capitalist hegemonic global structures. Technology transfer is 
important in revealing the international climate regime’s place at the heart of these 
structures.127 Suggestions that technology transfer could be facilitated by working 
with famously-neoliberal organisations such as the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) and with the private sector128,129 underline the confines in 
which those seeking to act in the interests of the world’s poor and vulnerable are 
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operating. Developing countries remain frustrated that the Technology Mechanism 
created under the UNFCCC only provides consultancy and information services 
rather than an actual transfer of technology that can be used for climate action and 
low-carbon development.130 The agreement in Paris COP21 did little to alter this, 
with a focus on innovation and enabling development of technology, and only 
passing reference to removing barriers that prevent the transfer of existing 
technology to nations where a need for it in facilitating climate action has been 
identified.131 The reluctance of developed countries to encourage action that goes 
directly against the core principles of neoliberal capitalism is not surprising, and in 
this context we must ask whether meaningful North-South technology transfer can 
ever possibly be achieved without disrupting hegemonic global structures. 
 
4. Can the international regime accommodate changing national circumstances, 
increasing scientific urgency and multiple perspectives on justice? 
 
This paper has shown that justice remains crucial to a new multilateral climate treaty 
as the international climate change regime begins a new phase after the Paris COP21 
in December 2015. There were some positive signs in advance of COP21, such as the 
US climate envoy acknowledging the necessity of addressing justice, which was a “U-
turn” from their infamous threat in Durban to walk away from an agreement that 
incorporates equity. Other positive signs included BASIC nations such as China 
making gestures towards announcing ambitious targets.132 However, at the climate 
talks leading up to Paris discussions remained intractable on transitioning out of 
fossil fuels, when large developing countries should reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, and how much financial support should be provided by which 
countries.133 These are familiar themes from the earliest days of climate change 
governance and proved to be central to the COP21 negotiations and outcome.  
There are grounds to suggest that the trend towards voluntary commitments 
and “parallelism” (the same or similar commitments by both rich and poor countries) 
poses the greatest threat to successful realisation of justice in climate change policy. 
Despite proposals such as the Equity Reference Framework134 and efforts by scholars 
and practitioners to explore various ways of interpreting and embedding widely 
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shared intuitions of fairness into the climate regime,135,136,137,138,139 there is little 
prospect of a robust discussion within the regime about adopting a framework or an 
equity assessment mechanism to underpin creation and review of INDCs. While the 
Paris Agreement includes recognition that it will be implemented to reflect equity 
and the CBDR+RC principle, the only mention of “climate justice” in the text is a 
short statement in the preamble section, which notes ‘the importance for some of 
the concept of “climate justice”, when taking action to address climate change’140 
(our emphasis). 
While general principles of differentiation have nominal weight, the 
complexity of realising justice means that with no framework there is little prospect 
that voluntary global climate action will be structured in a manner consistent with 
principles of fairness and justice. The inability of the international regime to impose 
or encourage the application of one or a limited set of justice principles remains a 
perennial constraint on the regime’s effectiveness and a challenge when translating 
justice concerns into practical action.141 Meanwhile, in the midst of the cacophony of 
perspectives, emissions are increasing as are negative impacts on vulnerable 
communities around the world.  
It is evident that the normative architecture of the global order remains 
hostile to solidarist conceptions of justice.142 Positive sentiment was encapsulated in 
the “high ambition coalition” in Paris, and promises of co-operation outside the 
international regime have given many observers reason to think there is greater 
momentum for cooperation. However, the withdrawal of Canada from Kyoto, the 
debacle of Copenhagen and the stance of many Western countries in recent 
negotiations suggest a renewed attack against even the minimalist notions of 
climate justice that were embodied in the pre-existing agreement. 
 It was clear from statements at COP21 in Paris that powerful nations were 
shaping the idea of legitimate differentiation, and seeking to focus on parity in 
economic development and their perspective that justice entails developing 
countries contributing more to climate action. 143  In reality, this levelling of 
expectations has actually entailed reducing emissions reduction expectations on 
developed countries while more burdens are imposed on developing countries that 
are already bearing the greatest brunt of climate change. There is therefore a sense 
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that the moral tenor of global climate governance has moved away from the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibility towards a perverse moral 
concept that Okereke has described as “common but shifted responsibility”.144 
An ethical analysis of the climate regime reveals an abiding strong 
interconnection between economic circumstances, geopolitical power and the 
justice claims that nations can assert in negotiations.145 Events within the climate 
regime highlight the importance of questioning the extent to which claims of justice 
can ever be truly realised in the context of international regimes of environmental 
governance as well as how much concerns for justice are motivated by other 
concerns such as relative economic gains or geopolitical objectives.146 It would 
appear that the progress made in entrenching justice at the heart of the climate 
agreement is now seriously threatened by the recent global financial crisis, which 
has served to awaken simmering egotistical impulses among state actors. 
Nevertheless, suggestions that the new pledge and review system has sidestepped 
the contentious justice debates that characterise the Kyoto Protocol cannot but be 
described as simply naïve and wishful thinking. Our work has demonstrated the 
depth and complexity of the present issues, and the magnitude of the challenge to 
overcome widespread disagreement.  
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